S ERHAPS Andy's most impor-tant and lasting contribution to the economics pnofession was his r-eseam-ch with Jerry Jom-dan that mesulted in the publication of the Andersen-Jordan (A-Jl equation on', as it is more widely known, the St. Louis equation. Almost immediately, the two found their-wor'k the subject of intense c-r-iticismn and contr'over-sy -mmmcli of which continues, though in tones that am-c significantly muted.'
'The monetary-fiscal policy debate was actually initiated prior to Andersen-Jordan (1968) by Friedman and Meiselman (1963) . Just as the ensuing debate surrounding Friedman and Meiselman's results was waning, however, Andersen and Jordan appeared, rekindling and intensifying the disagreement over the relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies. 2 While our review differs from recent ones by McCallum (1986) and Meyer and Rasche (1980) , it is necessary to traverse some of the ground they covered.
I.<Fl.l~151 '. t<c:u:&; 15.5(.J<:t[.[5((.~N ..<~,</ (<.55 cRU,ICS Recently, Cooley and LeRoy (19811 have ar-gued that a close cor-respondence tends to exist between the advocacy of a theory and the r-esults of scientific investigation. It is not sum-prising, therefon'e, that when two known and vocal proponents of monetarism r-epon-ted empirical r-esults that strongly suppom-ted monetarst propositions, the results were received with skepticism, which was intensified by theim-use of a single, "n-educed-for-ni" equation. Critics were suspicious that A-i inadvertently had either-misspecified the model or used faulty econometric techniques to obtain their results.' Three major criticisms emerged following the ptrblication of the A-J equation. Fir-si, it was ar-gtred than the equation was misspecified because impon'tant exogenous, r-ight-hand-side variables had been excluded. Second, critics claimed that A-J's use of on-dinany least squares (OLS) had resulted in sinrultaneotms equation bias. Finally, it was asserted that A-J had failed to identify the relevant exogenous indicator-s of monetary and fiscal policy actions. tmr addition, critics wene concerned that the A-J m'esolts were sample-specific or not robust to various econometn-rc modifications, including their use of Almnon's (1965) polynomial distmibuted lag estimation technique. The perception that A-J had somehow erred was enhanced when de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner (1969) , Silber (1971( and Schmidt and Waud (19731 tried unsuccessfully to n-eplicate the 3 A number of critiques appeared very shortly after the publication of the A-J paper, e.g., de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner (1969) , Davis (1969) , Corrigan (1970) , and Goldteld and Blinder (1972) .
The Monetary-Fiscal Policy Debate and the Andersen-Jordan Equation
A-i n-esults.~The following sections examine these cr-iticismns.
S ,,-< <, -'
The c-liar-ge that A-i had misspecified them' equation by omitting inipor-tanit variables, other than monetary and fiscal policy vam-iatrles, was leveled 1w numer-ous commentator-s. To understand this an'gn.nment, consider-the or-iginal A-J equation:
Ct) AY,"a+~~-F > i (I i = (1 where Y, M and E denote nomimial GNP, the money stock (Ml ( and nominal high-employment gover'nmerit expenditun-es, r-espectively, and u, denotes the usual m-andom distur-bamtce ter'm. 5 This equation can he wr-itten mor-e compactly as:
(2) Ax', a + f3ILIAM, + y(IJAE, + where~U( and -'jUl are polynomials in the lag open-ator U, such that L"x, = l,x,,, and where~UlAx, ar-c distributed lags of a finite on-der k.' A-i chose k = 3.
lfa relevant exogenous policy variable, Z,, is omitted, the tnue specification is riot eqtration 2, but 3) Ax', = a +~IL)AM, + y(L)AE, + 6)IJAZ, + ms in which case the en-i-or' term in equation 2 is u, a(L(Az, +~,. Fum-ther-rtior'e, estimates of the riiorietaiy amid fiscal policy r'esponises from equation 2 will he biased if AZ, is c-or-related with AM, or AE,.
Tins criticism of the A-J equation, while potentially damaging if valid, applies equally well to vim'tually all 4 1t now appears that these differences resulted from differences in programming or in the imposition of polynomial restrictions. have replicated the A-J results to the second or third decimal place. Even though other researchers may have been unable to replicate the A-J results exactly, their studies generally supported the qualitative findings of A-J. 'The original A-J paper also contained specifications with the adjusted monetary base as the indicator of monetary policy actions and a distributed lag of high-employment government revenues as an additional right-hand-side variable. Equation I is the most commonly estimated form of the equation, however.
Furthermore, following an exchange between Friedman (1977) and Carlson (1978) , the equation was specified in growth rates of the variables. It is interesting to note that A-J also estimated a growth-rate specification, but only reported the first-difference results. For the most part, the issues discussed betow are independent of the specification.
applied econonietr-ic r-esear-ch, including most lan-gescale, sinimsrltaneous-equation econome t r-ic models of the A-i vnitage! Moreover', although it was conimotilv ar-gired that the A-i equation was potentially misspecifled, econometric theory does not suggest that it is more susceptible to the r-esulting bias than other' estimated equations. Indeed, there was no evrdence that their results were biased since no tests for' rriisspecilication were per-f or-mired.
While their r'esmrlts provided no evidence that the A-i equation is misspecified, Modigliani and Ando (19761 presented evidence fi'om a Monte Carlo-style experiment that led sonic to doubt the validity of the A-i results.' Using ar-tificial data gener-ated by the MPS economnetr'ic nrodel, they used a St. Louis-style equation to estimate the reduced-fom-m pam-anieters. The results indicated that the St. Louis-style equation pr-oduced poor-estimates of the "true" mnonetary and fiscal multiplier's, seriously over-stating the size of the monetary influence and under-estimating the magnitude of the fiscal policy effect. 'l'hey concluded that the A-J reduced-for-m estimation technique yielded unreliable estimates.
This conclusion, however-, is imnwar-r-anted;' tf a 7 For example, Duesenberry et al. (1965) . 'See McCallum (1986), p. 17 and footnote 16. 'McCallum (1986) criticized the Modigliani-Ando results by arguing that they failed to distinguish between reduced-form and "finalform" multipliers. He considers the case where 2Z~= a, + a iSY, + a 2 iXM, + a,,~E, + me,. Substituting this expression into equation 3 yields the following:~Y, =~A f3'(L)AM, -r y'(L)AE, 4-5 where the coefficients are defined to conform, e.g., p' (L) 
. In contrast to the finite order distributed lags of the A-J equation 2, the distributed lags on this final-form equation are of an infinite order. Also, the error term of the A-J equation, u,, is hypothesized to be white noise, while that of the above equation, 5, is an infinite order AR process under the assumption about u,, The distinction between reduced-and final-form equations may not be important, however, because if the lags of the final-form equation are truncated to match those of equation 2, these equations are indistinguishable save the error structure. While this difference will allow one to distinguish between the two equations, it will only do so if one is willing to make strong claims about the underlying distribution of u. (McCallum notes this; see p. 24, footnote 8).
It is interesting to note, however, that our results obtained by adding a distributed lag of~Y to the A-J equation support McCaIlum's idea that the A-J results reflect all of the direct and indirect effects via lagged values of nominal GNP. A-J and Darby (1976) argued that the equation captured direct and indirect effects via other contemporaneous endogenous variables.
McCallum also argues correctly that "it is hard to imagine any important macroeconomic variable that is truly exogenous ..." (p. 13). If there are really no exogenous variables, however, then the true reduced form would be a Sims-type VAR model where the only exogenous variables would be the policy and, perhaps, other innovations, 'The notation used here is the same as employed by McCallum (1986) .
str'uctirr-al model is well defined with additive, nor--mnallv distributed en-r-or-s, consistent estimates of the r-edum:ed-fon-m parameter-s can be obtained by the use of indirect least squares, a Ia A-J." Because the Mt'S model does not miecessanly neflec:t the tr-ue structur-e of the U.S. economy (for' example, it ignores potentially irupor-tant sour-c-es of crowding out thirougli wealth effects and Ricar'diari equivalencel, the ModighaniAmido exper-iniient cannot he a cr-iticisnii of the A-i results or' of the A-i methodology.'' Consequemitly, the Modigliani-Ando e~idence is predominantly a statemerit about Keynesian vs. mnonetarist views of the won~ld.2Fur-them-mon-c, they provide no general infommation concer-nimng the useflulness of the n-educedfon-m estimation. By design, the A-i equation did riot conform to the n-educed for-m of the MPS model; so it is riot sur-pn-ising that the par-amneter' estimates wen-e poor. The experiment merely reminds us that, if one estimates a r-educed form that is known to be mnisspecified, the results may be biased.
(:IO/'Ak//rS L/Nr.uC~/ice
Except for-the usual checks for' serial c-or-n-elation ant heter-oskedasticity, the A-i equation was riot subjected to formal tests of model specification. Gordon (1976) came closest to testing the A-i equation for misspecification. Fle added a set of ''omitted variables,'' Z, to the St. louis equation. Claiming that these variables wer'e nomistochastic, lie tested for their' statistical significance amid mneasut-ed the impact of these variables on the A-J equation simply 1w observing whether' the~' affected the size and statistical significance of the estimnated long-n-un monetary and usc-al miiultipliers. Unfom-tum'rately, the Z-var'iable lie constructed -the sumn of net exports, consumer expenditures on new automobiles arid nonresidential fixed investmentwas an-guahly muon-c endogenous than the money arid "Unique estimates of the structural parameters cannot be obtained, however, unless the system is exactly identified. " Klein (1976) , p-So, noted in his discussion of the Modigliani-Ando paper, "If the world were constructed along tines portrayed by the MPS model, St. Louis conclusions could have been innocently obtained by one who did not bother to estimate the structure-This is the strongest statement that can be made," ' 2 Gordon (1976) chides Schwartz (1976) for missing the point of the Modigliani-Ando critique because she criticizes the specification of the MPS model. But this is exactly the point. Gordon later states incorrectly that "the major contribution of the paper is its demonstration that the correlation between included policy variables and other excluded variables severely biases the estimated St. Louis multipliers and renders useless the reduced torm technique" (p. 60).
expenditure variables that A-i had used. Hence, Gor--don's results, while by arid lan-ge tavon-able to A-i, say little about whether A-J's r-esults were atiected by specification errorS."
Ideally, one should test the specification of a model by companng it with a well-specified alter-native. Since the reduced for-ni of the MPS model (or any other' lam-ge-scale Keynesian model) is well specified, it could, in principle, be used as the alter-native in a test of the A-i equation. Unfortunately, most large-scale models have too many exogenous vamiables for-the r-educed for-m to be estimated directly. Even if it could be estimated directly, however, it would be difficult to obtain a data set that is contparably dated with the original A-J data.
This has prompted us to use a genen-al test of misspecification, the RESET' test of Ramsey and Schmidt (1976) , which requires no additional data. The RESET test is a gem'ieral diagnostic test for various types of misspecifications, including omitted variables. where the alter-native hypothesis is riot well specified." Applied to equation 2, the F-statistic calculated according to the Ramsey-Schmidt version of the RESE't' test is .52, which is not significant at the S pen-cent levels Hence, the RESET test pr-ovides rio suppor't fon claims that the origirial A-i equation was misspecified because A-i had omitted significant exogenous variables froniu their' analysis. ' 2 Gordon performed no formal tests. He noted merely that, when his Z-variable was included, the sum of coefficients on AM became smaller and, during one short period, was insignificant. (This period is the one for which the correlation between AM, and AM,,,, and his composite variable is the highest.) There was no discussion, however, of the problem of munticollinearity or possible bias induced by including variables that are clearly endogenous. (If these extraneous variables do not belong in the model, the estimates are consistent but may be biased in small samples.) "In general, if an equation is misspecified, the residuals will have a non-zero mean. The RESET test is designed to detect a non-zero mean of the residuals. The test is performed by adding Ax", Ax" Ax" as additional regressors to equation 2 and testing the hypotheses that these regressors have no joint effect on the dependent variable, The test here was performed for h~" 2,3,4; the result with the lowest significance level (in this case, h 3) is reported. See Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984) , pp.411-12, for a discussion of the RESET test.
"When A-J originally estimated equation 2, they used restricted least squares in the form of Almon's (1965) polynomial distributed lag estimation technique. We have recently shown, however, that none of the important conclusions of A-J depend on these restrictions lBatten and ]. Consequently, all of the empirical results reported here are obtained with OLS.
A ruumber' of critics ar-gued that the A-i r-esults wer-e unreliable because their policy variables were riot strictly exogeruous. 13cc-arise of their' knowledge of the issues stirroundinig tan-gets arid indicaton-s of riuonetary policy, A-i were acutely awam'e of the need to select exogenous indicator-s of policy. Indeed, they comisidered a bm-oad range of ruueasures of monetary arid fiscal actions that had been cited fl-elfuenthy in the liter-ature.' In their-analysis, they assumed that all excluded variables eithiem' were inidependent of monetary and fiscal actiomis or-wer-e influenced by thieruu, so that monetary and fiscal policies exen-ted aru indir-ect effect on the economy thunoughi these factor-s." A-i r-easoned that if monetary and fiscal influences wet-c not inudependent of other factor-s, the constant ter-m, which they am'gued summan-ized the iruipact of these factor's, would have changed as these variables changed. U sing a Chow test to test whuetlier-the parameten-s of theirequatiomi were tempor-ahlv stable, they found rio evidence of instability.
Given the attention that A-i gave to this issue, it is odd that their won-k was singled out as subject to simultaneous equation bias, when a nuriuber of wor'ks of applied economics of this virutage were not criticized fon-applying OLS to equations with might-liarudside variables that wem-e more clear-ly erudogenuous." Again, despite claims that the A-J results were questionable omu gr-ouruds of simultaneity, systeruuatic testirig for simultaneous equation bias luas beer'r sparse. McCallunu (1986) 'Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Absolute value oft-ratio in parentheses
A comparison of OhS and IV estiniates shows sonire Ian-ge differences, par'ticulan-l,v for the coefficiemuts omi AM, anud AE,. The IV estimates show a smnaller' initial effect of motley arid a lan-ger' iruitial effect of governmerit expenditur-es relative to the GUS estimates, Never-thueless, thue Wtn tesl chi-squar-e statistic is .20, not statistically significant at the S perc emit level.
It is not too surprising that the IV est i muia tes ar-e r-elativelv iruipt-ecise. the first-stage ft's wer-e.54 and .38 for AM, arud A K,, respectively. Moreover, the ftc t that three lags of~M, amid Al-;, are used as insrrunuuents means that AKl, and Aft, ar-e likely to be higlulv c-or-related with the other n-egr'essor-s of the A-.l equatio muWhile the test could be carried on t with alter-native instruments, there is no obvious guide to their selection -tn any event, it is u rulikeiv tluat thue rest Its will he Andersen (1969) . "This possibility was also considered by McCallum (1986) and Darby (1976) , though McCallum included a lagged dependent variable to obtain his distinction between the reduced form and the final form; see footnote 9 above. "One of the most important of these was Chow's (1966) pathbreaking work on money demand, in which current values of real GNP and a nominal interest rate appeared on the right-hand side of the equation. 'iinrruIlmrimrl~rr-mjmirrr'-, turir 1 rmrral lrrmlbsrm1 Irr-lnr-r-rr rlrrrrle~mu' rulrmrurlr I rip-liii-l,r'I rI Urru,'mrI'.U,U m.mrr-.,rIil~lrrrrur iunrmrrrrm hr rnirrulm\ I', .1 rrr-rrs-,.trt lurrmmn.1r r,mrr -,mrilirjmrnl umrrnmlrlrmrrn mm sl,rli-,tmr-rl r~_uuLnm-rir-rh~\~Iir-rrl.llrmutl l~u7.5 jrr-rIirmrruu-rI li--I-, mn (rnur~~mm Ii l~I rm l ri' r rri ir ii,.' . I r rr -ri ri • ,r rim I r( II r I ri -r r r-~1rrrnrlllrrri-,-. hr lrrririrl mrrnimlmrru tioru,il i .,rrsrlrl~null See Wa r'9t3~nbr ,r L:.bcrJ.,,romr rI tI r~sprscrJr-s ning flom money to inconue arid bidin-ectiotual causality between expenditures arid inucome?' More r-eceruthy, using the original A-i data, Batten amid Thor'nton (1985) found unidin-ectionah causality running fnonuu monuey to income and no causal ordering between incomne and expendit ut-es.
able 2 Estimates of an Autoregressive Version of the Andersen-Jordan Equation
The fact that mconue (foes not Gn-anuger-cause money implies Iluat the coeffucieruts on the distr-ibuted lag of AM, do riot reflect the feedback of imicome on itself via ruuoney; instead, thuese coefficients measur-e the dir-cc-I, and possibly indin-ect, citec-Is of monuey on the economy. 'ho verifr this interpr'etation, a threequarter distnibjuted lag of AY was included mu the A-i equation as separate regressors and the significance of these coefficients was tested. 'Flue resuhts am-c r'epor-ted in table 2. The coefficiemuts on the lags of the dependent variable are riot significantly different fioruu zero -irudividuahhy or-jointly. Furthermore, the coetlicients on the nuoney and expenditure variables differ' little fl-our the OhS results of table 1.
itms LvkWrwe
Although his criticismn was not dir-cc-ted explicitly at the A-i equation, Sims (1980 Sims ( ,1982 huas ar-gued n-ecenthy that the impact of monetary policy actions is very small if intenest nates are included in the same equation.
2 ' To investigate Sinus' conjecture, we added a contenupon-aneous and thn-ee-quar-ter-distributed lag of the change in the thn-ee-motith Treasury bill n-ate (ATBI to the A-i equation."'t'he n-esults, m'epom-ted in table 3, sluow thuat only thue conitempon-aneous coefiucierut on SIB is significant. Mon-cover', the coefficients oru the money and expenditure vaniables are little changed fr-onu those in table 1, and none of the qualitative conclusions about thue effectiveness of nuionetaiy onfiscal policy actions is altered.
'l'hns, as was the case for-allegations of misspecificationu, then-c is consider-able dispanity betweenu the conventional wisdom and the enuupirical results concerning the issue of simultaneity. Neven-thueless, thue claim that sinuultaneity is a serious problemu for the A-i equation is a deeply entn-enched anud widely accepted "Elliott used Sims' (1972) procedure which requires that the data be filtered, a process that can affect the test results. See Feige and Pearce (1979) . "McCallum (1983 "McCallum ( . 1986 ) has critiqued Sims' results on theoretical grounds.
"The equation was also estimated with the level of the Treasury bill rate; however, none of the qualitative conclusions were changed.
criticism of their-work:' The evidence exanuined in this section, however-, suggests that estimatioru of the original A-i equation was not affected by simultaneity. in a sense, this argument is an extension of the policy endogeneity amgument since its proponents contended that the appropr-iate indicator of nuonetary policy should not respond endogenously to forces outside of the Fed's control. For-exanuple, in the first published criticism of A-J, de Leeuw and Kalchbrenncr (1969) criticized the use of the monetary base (and implicitly Ml) as an indicator-of monetany policy actions on the grounds that some of its components (particularly, currency and borrowed reserves) were endogenous and not controlled by the Fed directly." instead, de Leeuw and Icalchbrenner offer-cd an alternative exogenous policy measure that they obtained by subtnacting cun-r-ency and bon-m-owings fn-om the adjusted nuonetamy base~.When they estiniated an A-i type equation using their-measure of monetary policy actions, they found the cutuiulative nuonetary polic multiplien was much snualler than that of the A-i equation and not significantly diffen-ent floruu zero. On the other-hand, their' estinuated cumulative govem-nment spending multiplier was substantially lar-ger amid was statistically significant." in their reply, A-J (1969) pointed out that de Leeuw and Kalchbr-enner-'s focus on the rises of tIm ruuonetary base was inappropriate. Although the banks and the public deter-mine the uses ofthe base, the Fed conutr-ols the size of the nuuonetary base thrmnnghu its irufluetuce over the sources of the base, tlue lar-gest conuiponient of "While Andersen and Jordan acknowledged that money could be endogenously related to income and expenditure variables via a Fed reaction function," they considered this to be of little practical significance. See Andersen and Jordan (1969), p. 16. "For some, the concern was that some of the effect of fiscal policy might be incorrectly attributed to monetary policy. See Blinder and Solow (1974) .
"This line of argument was also taken by Gramfich (1971) .
"Government receipts were also included; the estimated cumulative multiplier of government receipts also increased but was statistically significant only with longer lags. iridrcales stahrsrrcar smgnrtrcance at the S percept leve: Absolute value of the t-rat,o rn parentheses which is the F'ed's holdings of U.S. government securities. Thus, the F'ed determines the size of the monetary base thr-ough its sales or punthases of gover-nmenut securities.
Fun-thuer-mnore, A-i noted that chanuges in the Ml money stock during their estinuation period wer-e dominated by changes imi the nuuonetany huase. 1-terice, the F'ed exercised corutrol oven' MI throughu its control of thue sources of thue monetary base. Since this cxchange, the disagr-eenuuent over the mneasur'emuuent of nuuonetary policy actions has subsided, and the muuonetary base and NIl (and, at tiruues, broader ruuoruetary aggn'egates) are geruer-ahIv accepted, anud commonly used, as indicators of policy actions.
A-J 's measur-ernerut of fiscal policy actiorus was cinti cized more thatu tlueir measure of nmonretar-v pohic actiomus. tlecognnzirug that cerRuru corui poruents of botlu federal goven-nument expenditun'es and rcyeniues respond erudogenousiv to the level of ecoruoruuic activity, A-i utilized luiglu-enuuplovruuemut measun'es, wluicbu were adjusted for these inhluemuces. tJe I eeuw armd KahchuFE5~ERAi'4E5ERV7',ianr~05 57. WWS bnennem' contended that thuis adjustnuent was inconuphete tuecause it failed to elinuuinate the influence of infhation. TIne substitution of irufiation-adjusted, highemployment goven-nment expenditures and m'evenues, however-, had little impact on the estimated fuaranueten-s of the equation. Gnanuhich (1971) felt that the non-monetary exogenuoims" irufluences wen-e too narrowly defined. Consequently, he constr-ucted two tun'oader composite incasun-es. His expenditun-e measure was government purchases plus exports, gr-ants-in-aid arid an inventory adjustnuent for defense purchases. His revenue measur-e included higlu-employment per-sonal taxes plus interest pavnuents and social security contributions less exogenous tn-anusfems (that is, all tn-anst'ers except unemployment compensation). While these changes did r-esuht in larger-(and mon-c nearly statistically significant) sunus of estimated coefficients for-the non-monetary influences, the gener-al r-esults of A-i remained intact.
Cor'rigan (1970) often-ed whuat appear-ed to be the most damaging cr-iticism of the buigh-emphoyment measun-es of fiscal policy actions. He argued tluat they did not represent appropniate iiudicators of discretionany fiscal policy actions, since high-employruuent nueasures especially n-eyenues) would change with highi-enuployruuent incoruue. Iru thuein place, he offered lus initial stimulus 1151 nueasur-e of discr-etionary changes in fiscal policy. The IS nuueasun-e ofgover-nnuuent expendntun'es did not tufter' significantly frtm thue highuenuployruuent nueasur-e. '[hue IS nuueasure of revenues, on thue otluer-harud, differed corusider-aluhv fn-om its huighu enupho~rnuent cornnter-par-t. In pam-ticulan-, the IS measure of a cluange iru gover-nntient r'evenues was nonzero only in quarter-s in which a tax was irutroduced, mothfled, suspended or' eliminated.
Whuen iS nueasinr-es wen-e sulustituted for' highemployment mtueasures in an A-i type equation, the results were stan-thing: the estimated cunuulative iruupact of chuaruges in Ml declined, while those of bothu changes in goven-nment exlueruclitunes anti of charuges in government r-evenues nose significantly and, mon-c impon-tanthv, were apparently statistically significant." 'thus, Conrigani concluded that fiscal policy actions huad a meaningful impact on norunnah ecoruomic activity.
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Subsequently, however-, Schmidt and Waud (1973) found that Con'rigan's results depended critically on the polynomial r-estrictions he imposed.' 8 When these restrictions, which appear-cd to be rejected by the data, were relaxed, Schmidt arid VVaud obtained results with the IS measur-es that were similar to A-i's.
The evidence suggests that A-i's results coneer-ning the effect of fiscal policy were not cnitically dependent on their-measurenuent of monetary or fiscal policy actions. Meyer and Rasche (1980) summan'ized their investigation of this issue by noting that, 'the modifications suggested ... have not genen-ally resulted in dramatic changes in the estimated multipliers in sunpIe reduced-fon'm equations." -To estimate their dynamic specification, A-J used Ahmon's (1965) polynomial distributed lag estimation technique that was designed to improve the pnecision of the estimated parameter-s of a distributed-hag model. The technique constn-ains the paranneter-s of each distributed hag to lie on a polynomial of a given degree. Perhaps because relatively little was known about the procedure when A-i pubhishued their paper-, critics contended that the A-i results might hue dependent upon, on-at least sensitive to, their-choice of hag length or polynomial degr-ee:" There huave been relatively few investigations of this aspect of the A-i equation. The tuest-known study by Schmidt and Waud (1973) , as well as others by Conigan, de Leeuw and Kalchbrenner', and Silben-, focused primarily on the selectionu of thue lag lengtlu. Because these studies held the pohymuonuial degnee fixed, how-"Corrigan did not report t-statistics or standard errors for the summed coefficients. Assuming that fhe estimated coefficients are uncorrelated, one obtains a t-statistic of 3.01 for testing the hypothesis that the IE = 0 and a t-statistic of 9.46 for testing that IT = 0. Both of those are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
"The restrictions forced the estimated parameters of each distributed lag to lie on a second degree polynomial.
" Meyer and Rasche (1980), p. 59. McCallum (1986) , p. 14, simply notes that if there is a fiscal policy measure that carries a strongly significant sum of coefficients in an equation of the St. Louis form, its existence has not been well publicized."
"Specifically, if the lag length is too long or the polynomial degree too high, estimated parameters are unbiased but inefficient. Alternatively, it the lag length is too short or the polynomial degree is too low, the estimates are biased, Therefore, it is important that the appropriate lag length and polynomial degree be determined. The parameters will also be biased if the chosen lag is too long and exceeds the true lag by more than the true polynomial degree and may be biased even if it exceeds the true lag by an amount less than or equal to the true polynomial degree. See Batten and Thornton (1983) for a discussion of this and other issues, and for other references. S
ever, they did not analyze completely the r-estrictionus imposed by the A-J specificationu1'
When Elliot (1975) examined the lag structure and the polynomial r-estr-ictions separately, he coruchuded that A-i nesults were not par-ticuharly serusitive to lag structur-e on-to the polynomial restrictions. His conclusionu, huoweven, was riot luased on statistical tests. He nuen-ely conupar-ed pan-ameter estinuates for-differenit hag stn-uctures amid po~nomial degrees. More recently, Batten and Thor-ntomu (1983) per-formed a systematic examination of the specification of the A-i eqination using n-ecent data, and Batten and Thon-nton 11985) perfor-rned a similar' analysis using the original A-i data. 'h'hey concluded that the pohicy-rehevarut restnhts of A-i do not depend on thueir choice of hag length or Iuolynonuiah degree.
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Leonall C. Andersen's best known and nuost significant contribution to economics is his collaborative resear-ch with Jerry L. ion-dan, which resulted iru puhulication of the A-J equation. For a per-iod of neanly 20 yean-s, it has been the suhuject of nuuch inter-est arud considerable criticism.' Few other-pieces of applied economics, if any, have been so thuon'oughuly discussed, analyzed and investigated.
Our-review of thue original Aruder-senu-ior-dan sttndv arud thue cn-iticisrn thuat emerged following its publication points out the obvious, but seldoruu articulated, fart that all of the criticisms of Aruder-semu arid ion-danu's work apply equally well to much of thue applied econonuuic researchu of that tinuue, and even today. We also ruote that Ander-sen and iordaru were aware of many of tine caveats of their won-k and took pr-ecautions against them. Most imuupor-tanthy, using threim' origirual data, we tested the Andersenu-bondanu equatioru for nuisspecification and simultaneous-equatiomu bias. We finud that none of the oft-cited cniticisnus of their equationu is (or could buave tueeru) suhustanitiated by these statistical tests. Gr-anted, sonue of the techniques used wer-e 'After the polynomial degree has been chosen, alternative lag specifications amount to imposing polynomial restrictions on different parameter spaces. Consequently, the restrictions implied by different lag specifications are not nested within each other when the polynomial degree is fixed. "One on the most recent additions no this literature, Ral and Siklos (1986) , applies spectral analysis to the Andersen-Jordan equation forthe period 1/1947 to (v/I 984. Again the results are consistent with those of A-J.
unkruown or unavailable whueri Anuderseru anti iordan's critics were most vocal. Fur-ther-nuore, sonic of the criticisms an-c valid when applied to sample Iuen'iods beyond that exannirued by Anudersen arid ion-dan:' These facts notwithstanding, this review vindicates Andersen and ion-dan of anuy serious breachu of the standarils of econoruietr-ic pr-actice arid suggests that, in reality, it was riot their-application of ecomuomnetr-ic methuods that was controversial, but their n-esultss'
Andersen arid ion-dan should be corugn'atulated for' providing one of the ruuost stable, hasting and robust equations mu applied econionuuics. In our opinion, however', tlueir' most iruupom-tant conutrnbutioru is that they shtook the foundations of coruveritional econonuic thought and subjected the r-esults of starudaril applied econonuics to closer scrutiny. This forced econuonuists and policynuiaker-s tn take a closer hook at the issue of the efficacy of monetary and fiscal pohic.
